Il linguaggio comune dell'odio come ideologia

Nella tarda serata del 19 febbraio scorso, si è consumato ad Hanau, in Germania, l’ennesimo attacco di matrice xenofoba. Una strage di 9 persone di nazionalità turca, con numerosi feriti, attuata da un singolo individuo con  chiaro scopo terroristico e con un  video-testamento politico colmo di deliranti esternazioni. Le modalità operative e comunicative hanno ricordato, però, le azioni terroristiche di tutt’altra tendenza, ossia quelle jihadiste,  le cui rivendicazioni   si rifanno  ovviamente ad argomentazioni differenti. Tuttavia, il linguaggio del video dell’omicida di Hanau, com’era già avvenuto per altri attentati, ha manifestato attitudini simili e traslati ricorrenti anche nella comunicazione jihadista. Ciò perché  derivano da un’unica matrice, ossia l’odio verso il differente da sé, dalla propria cultura, religione e tradizione. Un odio che non è  più semplicemente marginato nel vissuto personale del terrorista di turno, ma che trova un consenso diffuso e radicato in una parte dell’opinione pubblica, tanto da evolvere in ideologia vera e propria. Insomma, per quanto opposti, il jihadismo radicale, l’eversione e l’intolleranza violenta xenofoba e antisemita di una generica estrema destra propria del mondo occidentale, risultano del tutto simili  e addirittura integranti l’un l’altra. Considerazioni che partono proprio  dal tipo di  linguaggio utilizzato nella  propaganda, nelle rivendicazioni  e nei video-testamenti degli attentatori che, alla fin fine, risulta avere grandi affinità ed analogie.

Insomma, si tratta di un linguaggio comune alle due estreme anime del terrorismo contemporaneo. Se si potesse tradurre  questo estremismo in un’immagine, il linguaggio comune lo  tradurrebbe non come un fenomeno lineare ma a ferro di cavallo, con le punte più vicine fra loro di quanto esse lo siano nei confronti del centro.

Per chi, come me, per mestiere deve analizzare fatti, dichiarazioni, rivendicazioni e documenti di azioni terroristiche ed eversive o di violenza politica, per prevederne l’evoluzione e attuare azioni di contrasto, il fenomeno del ‘linguaggio comune’ dell’estremismo violento, di qualsiasi matrice ideologica o religiosa, non è  affatto una novità. È presente da più di un ventennio, già prima dell’11 settembre 2001, quasi in contemporanea con l’esaurirsi delle semplici e tradizionali   contrapposizioni ideologiche passate,  con un andamento però crescente e più diffuso negli ultimi  anni grazie anche all’utilizzo, da parte dell’eversione del nuovo millennio,  di sistemi di comunicazione veloci ed  i social network.

Ciò che è meno noto è, invece, la relazione simbiotica che è venuta a crearsi fra gli innumerevoli soggetti o manifestazioni eversive che finiscono così per  sostenersi vicendevolmente nell’intolleranza reciproca violenta, facendo un servizio a  soggetti politici faziosi e settari, in una triangolazione di odio di difficile controllo,  che sembra  ora riprodursi all’infinito e senza limiti geografici.

Avviene ciò che è stato definito “estremismo cumulativo”. In pratica, e detto con parole più semplici, l’estremismo di matrice religiosa, ad esempio jihadista, alimenta anche solo a parole ma con smisuratezza, quello xenofobo di movimenti politici dell’estrema destra, e viceversa. Il paradosso, però, e addirittura il risultato più rischioso, è che finiscono sovente per esprimersi, insieme,  con argomentazioni violente ed aggressive condivise, quali l’ antisemitismo e l’odio per lo straniero.

Si tratta di una ‘radicalizzazione reciproca’ che pare creare un mutuo beneficio. Che si tratti di far propaganda per il jihad e inneggiare alla morte di infedeli, oppure di soddisfare il nichilismo di crisi identitarie di soggetti vulnerabili, come l’attentatore di Hanau o quello della sinagoga di Halle, in Sassonia, dell’ottobre scorso, quel linguaggio comune è una sorta di fertilizzante che alimenta l’odio reciproco e finisce per accrescere la tendenza alla radicalizzazione di entrambi e di altri fenomeni eversivi  di là da venire.

Gli argomenti comuni, poi, sono innumerevoli: la visione apocalittica del futuro  dove domina, quasi sempre, una battaglia o  una soluzione ‘finale’  a danno del nemico - che sia  l’Occidente o l’Islam, non fa differenza - o addirittura l’inevitabilità della guerra o dello scontro fra civiltà o religioni. È sempre una lotta contro il comune rischio di venir travolti da un processo inarrestabile, che sia ‘l’islamizzazione dell’Occidente’ o ‘l’Occidentalizzazione dell’Islam’. Vi è sempre una vittima (il ‘noi’) contro un ‘demone’ (l’altro, il differente), da cui, appunto processi di ‘vittimizzazione’ e ‘demonizzazione’ ricorrenti su entrambi i fronti. Argomentazioni  che ben si adattano all’instabilità politica o alle fasi di recessione o di crisi economica interna a molti Paesi, occidentali e non.

Altro tema costante e comune sono i fenomeni immigratori, che non vengono più distinti fra legali ed illegali ma interpretati come  un rischio generalizzato, ossia - come è accaduto anche nella campagna a favore della Brexit, quindi, ed è bene sottolinearlo, in un contesto non violento e non terroristico ma emblematico al riguardo – come il fatale ‘scambio di popolazione’ e la conseguente messa in pericolo dell’identità etnica e culturale, sino addirittura,  alla ‘morte di una nazione’.

Inevitabile che questo processo,  fra settarismo e fanatismo, e in una sorta di realizzazione di vasi comunicanti, finisca per accrescere, vicendevolmente, l’intolleranza, quasi a legittimarla ai loro occhi, ripescando dalla storia argomentazioni -anch’esse valide  per entrambi - come l’antisemitismo, il negazionismo dell’Olocausto e la pulizia etnica-religiosa, o i simboli come la svastica nazista o le bandiere nere con  le citazioni del Corano per il ritorno del Califfato.

Ciò che ora preoccupa chi deve contrastare il terrorismo e l’eversione di estrema destra o quello che si rifà al suprematismo bianco, a livello globale, è che soggetti come l’omicida di Hanau o  quello di Halle, o l’australiano che a marzo del 2019 uccise 51 persone nelle moschee di Christchurch in Nuova Zelanda - per citare gli ultimi  eventi -  non si possano più definire come ‘cani sciolti’. Come i ‘lupi solitari’ del jihadismo – altro esempio di condivisione di questo linguaggio comune – si ha ormai la percezione che questi ultimi attori dell’ eversione si sentano meno isolati e marginali di un tempo, e quanto invece legittimati ad agire attraverso una sorta di agenda politica comune, condivisa globalmente, la cui narrazione passa lungo la rete internet. Non solo emulazione, che è il rischio più ricorrente, quanto una sorta di movimento che già dispone di un’organizzazione globale in fieri.

È la preoccupazione espressa in un articolo del New York Times di questi giorni che espone documentazione e report al Dipartimento di Stato che testimoniano come si sia di fronte a strutture di suprematisti bianchi e neonaziste organizzate come al-Qaeda negli anni ’80 e ’90 che, per il reclutamento e la propaganda, trascendeva i confini nazionali di Arabia Saudita o dell’Afghanistan. E si è visto ciò che  al-Qaeda è riuscita a realizzare senza una politica iniziale, comune e condivisa globalmente, di prevenzione e contrasto da parte della comunità internazionale.

Il timore, espresso  dai redattori di quell’articolo, è che questo organismo, composto da molteplici  gruppi inneggianti il suprematismo bianco,  non sia più solo ed esclusivamente una minaccia interna agli Stati Uniti ma internazionale. Inoltre, sebbene con la condivisione all’estero di esperienze simili – come campi di addestramento in Ucraina, ad esempio – si teme che queste stretture non vengano classificate, a livello nazionale e internazionale, come ‘organizzazioni terroristiche’, impedendo, di fatto, di agire in maniera concorde e globale nel contrastarle con, ad esempio, la condivisione di informazioni fra intelligence nazionali oppure sanzionando eventuali Stati o formazioni politiche sponsor. Ovvio che si tratta di mancanza di cultura al riguardo da parte delle autorità politiche. Ma ciò che sottintende l’articolo è che si tratti altresì di volontà politica affinché ciò non accada.

Eppure, il terrorismo è terrore, sempre, contro indistinti soggetti ed in ogni luogo del pianeta,  con la medesima crudeltà e, a quanto pare, con il medesimo linguaggio. A questi ‘venditori ambulanti di odio’ – come li definisce il NYT -  è ora di contrapporre, con risoluta coscienza, forme di contrasto politiche e legislative della portata o addirittura superiori a quelle utilizzate sino ad ora contro il jihadismo, contribuendo a formare una consapevolezza dei rischi che l’intera comunità, senza distinzioni geografiche, sta correndo nell’alimentare la radicalizzazione dell’estrema destra all’interno dei rispettivi confini nazionali, con portata però mondiale. Questo è già ora, come il suo  acerrimo nemico ma al contempo alter ego, il terrorismo di matrice jihadista, un fenomeno pericoloso, globale, dinamico e multidimensionale. Questo è anche il primo e scontato risultato del linguaggio   dell’odio come ideologia.

 

scritto per "La Porta di Vetro", 24/2/2020

 

Foto Reuters

 

Libya after Berlin Conference

The Berlin Conference on Libya ended with a 55-point road map that should lead to pacification of the warring parties. The perception is that few things have diverged from what was  decided in Palermo, in November 2018, in a  similar meeting between the Libyan protagonists, albeit then with important absences, as a consequence the results  were insignificant. The war tangled further,  with new external actors and  internal disillusions. So, will the Berlin Conference  really be  a small step forward a durable truce or even peace, as Chancellor Merkel said? It is desirable, but not so certain.

Haftar’s behaviour creates, in fact, new fears. He is still reluctant to give back  weapons and taps of the oil wells of Cyrenaica. At least in his  words, he intends to continue his control over the territory, even conquering  the capital  of Tripoli, controlled by  his enemy al-Sarraj. It is not a  coincidence that both did not sign any agreement in Berlin.

However, Haftar is old, tired and, according to observers close to him, is willing to speed things up, perhaps with an all-out military offensive if he does not get what his sponsors want from the international community.

Putin is the only guarantee that Haftar’s menace will not occur. Putin openly supports Haftar, at the same time as also being militarily and financially supported by Egypt and the UAE, not at all convinced of the holding of the last truce. It is useless to deny that if Berlin  makes a small step forward through the global meeting of all the actors in Libya, it will be because Putin and Erdogan decided to attempt a change of that conflict during  the inauguration of TurkStream, in Ankara on January 8th. Without that goodwill, the Berlin diplomatic carousel  would not have started.

It demonstrates, once again, that the European Union as a whole,  even with the United Nations, are unable to mediate and influence the complex and articulated internal and international situation of post-Gaddafi Libya without the strong intervention of  Russia and Turkey. The future post-Berlin can not ignore the political wills of Putin and Erdogan, followed by those of the United States and, at a long distance, limping in a very scattered order, each on their own, by those of each of the European countries.

The explanation of the nascent 'dominance' of Russia and Turkey is all in what Putin and Erdogan managed and achieved in Syria, where European intemperance and Obama's hesitations gave rise to mistrust and even scepticism by the Middle Eastern (and later North African) actors regarding  the United States’ leadership and the European Union’s role  as an objective interlocutor.

A lack of trust that is dearly costing both in terms of political influence - to regain it, the USA do not hesitate to  carry out operations  such as the one against Iranian Qassem Soleimani - while Russia and Turkey, for some analysts - and how to blame them? – seem to be almost 'resolvers' or even 'stabilizing powers' in different crises or conflict areas.

Putin sees the possibility of expanding the Russian sphere of influence not only in the central Mediterranean sea (the Libyan port of Tobruk, already strategic for the Soviets during the Cold War, is a target), but also in Africa where Moscow has been on the rise for some years. This is why Putin invests in military support (not with troops but with weapons and private contractors) and in political mediation where, albeit in the presence of political crises or military conflict, Russia could set up its support bases.

However, in my opinion, the role of Erdogan and his ambitious plans could be even more dangerous for Italian security. A lot  has already been written about his neo-Ottoman ambitions, but in Libya, and North Africa in general, such as even in the Balkans, a region that is never  studied enough,  Turkish dreams go far beyond.

Since Merkel and Sarkozy's refusal to bring Turkey into  the European Union and the degeneration of the Arab springs from internal revolts to civil and regional wars, Erdogan has no longer made  his ambitions’ secret, with Turkish and Islamist influence in the former Ottoman Empire’s territory. To achieve them, Erdogan has guaranteed open support for the Muslim Brotherhood, jihadist forces in the Middle Eastern scenario and, as we know, now also in Libya.

However, the Brotherhood is the main enemy of the Egyptian al-Sisi and his international allies. It is always accompanied by violent action of the Libyan Madkaliti brigades  (a branch of Sunni Salafism) to which Gen. Haftar belongs. Once tolerated by Gaddafi as part of his  anti-Brotherhood strategies, Haftar's Madkalites now feel legitimized to fight, with arms, other Sunnis supported by  Erdogan’s Islamist inclinations  and his claims to dominate Libya. Ultimately, there is yet another confrontation within the Sunni Muslim community that the Western world has difficulty in understanding because of its exclusive economist approach to all international crises. For this reason, it is not accustomed at all to internal conflicts in cultures other than its own. That's why the Libyan scenario has become much more complex and dangerous for Europe and consequently for Italy.

In fact, Turkey has been operating for some time a kind of soft power through the institution of  cultural centers and the construction of mosques, from Africa to Europe, from Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and, precisely, in the Balkans where the largest European mosque (among many planned) will be in Tirana, Albania, as  result of exclusive Turkish funding. Not least, like Putin, Erdogan is also showing interest in Central Asia.

Erdogan’s Islamist ambitions thus have a very particular weight, in consideration of the fact that Libya, like other  countries devastated by the Arab Spring aftermaths, does not even have a valid and shareable secular alternative among its countless economic, social and tribal realities. It is difficult to imagine a political process, arising from  the people which lead to a lasting truce or even peace for Libya, that does not  consider the Islamist inclination of Turkey and of other subjects now involved and in competition, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt or the UAE.

Not least, European interlocutors aggravate everything because,  even if they make declarations of good will and intentions, they continue to approach the Libyan chaos with exclusively economic concerns: first of all, the supply of oil at risk, followed by the threat of illegal migrants and the related costs for security and, for some countries, the loss of control of strategic resources or routes, such as the Greenstream pipeline. It is the case of France and its fear of losing not only Libyan oil, but also the control of the Nubian waters underlying the Libyan desert, that are channeled in the 4.000 km long the Great Artificial River of Gaddafi. A strategic infrastructure that from the subsoil of Cyrenaica  brings drinking water to the Libyan coasts. The desire of the great French water corporations, Suez, Ondeo and Saur (which control 45% of the planet's fresh water), to privatize that strategic water supply was the main reason that led Sarkozy to attack Libya in 2011.

Nothing has changed since then, and Macron's anxiety about supporting Haftar proves it.

To bring about a change in the Libya conflict,  the European approach needs to be ultimately and  totally reversed. However, there is no adequate and sufficient knowledge, culture and political will to do it.  Instead, European internal struggles (France and Italy, for example), to acquire strategic resources with huge economic and financial interests, abound. As al-Sarraj argued, Europe wasted too much time and is now struggling in a competition, with an already obvious result. The outcome of the coexistence in Libya between the Islamist drives of Erdogan and those of the political power of Putin will be less predictable. However,  this is another chapter of a never ending story of confrontations in Libya.

 

edizione in italiano, "La Porta di Vetro", 20/1/2020.

 

 

Privatization of war. Modern contractors and ancient mercenaries

Recently, there has been a lot of talk about mercenaries, paid by foreign powers and engaged in the increasingly numerous conflicts, of all levels of intensity, everywhere in the world. From the beginning of the new year,  the tone has become stronger because of Syrian jihadists, salaried by Turkey and sent to Libya to fight alongside al-Sarraj's troops  opposed to, among others, the Russian mercenaries of the powerful Wagner paramilitary organization of Yevgeny Prigozhin, and in assistance to gen. Haftar and his allies. In many analysts’ opinion, they represent Puntin and Russia’s direct involvement in the Libyan conflict. The risk is to transform it into one similar to the Syrian war. There are all the premises and also similar actors.

However,  news  about foreign jihadists and mercenaries in Libya caused  sensation, but only for people not  accustomed to international security.  For years, in fact, the phenomenon of private companies engaged in war scenarios has been present,  spread, flourished and  taken on many characteristics that will soon create fears also for Italian domestic security.

Let's proceed in order,  making the necessary distinctions to understand a complex issue, treated like a taboo and therefore never  followed as it deserves.

As it always happens in the thorny issues of the new millennium’s international relations, the watershed is once again due to the end of the cold war, followed  by demobilization,  downsizing and above all  reorganization of all national armies on both fronts,  Western and Soviet. It is estimated that within a decade, the ‘90s, at least 7.4 million former soldiers suddenly became unemployed, in front of an increasing number of local and interregional conflicts, to which was added the war on terror after September 11, 2001.

At first it was Afghanistan, and then Iraq, where private contractors  (such as the Blackwater, responsible for the massacre of civilians in Baghdad, in 2007) began to emerge as  professionals alongside the career soldiers and engaged in functions such as logistics, close protection of people and structures, and procurement that had suffered cuts in national budgets. Functions that, however and in a short time, expanded to operational support, training and combat actions, due to  the increase of limited conflicts  in which States without adequately prepared staff were involved.

The interventions of private military and security companies increased, with their expansion into 'sensitive' sectors such as intelligence and analysis, with a turnover that, it has been estimated,  to be around $ 50-60 billion annually.

It soon became compelling to attempt regulation.

The first engaged contractors belonged, and still do, to the so-called private military (PMC), security (PSC) and intelligence (PIC) companies. Their use is now regulated by the 2008 Montreaux Document (Italy joined it in June 2009), drawn up on the   initiative of Switzerland, under the auspices of the International Red Cross and in compliance with the Geneva Conventions of international humanitarian laws in conflict zones.

The Montreux Document consists of a generic legal framework, signed and shared by 56 states, 3 supranational bodies and some large NGOs that,  for some years, have been  extensively using private contractors services  in crises or conflict areas.

However, if  signing of the Montreux Document by the United States, many of the European countries and China stand out most of  all, the signatures of Russia and of all the Middle Eastern states, except Jordan and Iraq, are missing. It is not a trivial matter, due to the growing armed divergences in that region and the influence’s ambitions of all its protagonists, in particular Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

In fact, it is not a  coincidence that these States, lacking in men in uniform but abundant in money and armaments (Saudi Arabia is the third country in the world for weapons’ purchase) have for years resorted to authentic mercenaries, such as  in the old style, as in Machiavelli's judgment, of the "unnecessary and dangerous" armed gangs,  made up of  former members of élite forces, criminals and drug traffickers looking for new jobs. This is the case of the Colombians, Panamanians, Chileans and Salvadorans who, hired by Reflex Responses (R2), and trained by American, British and Israeli 'professionals' and under the guidance of the Colombian mercenary Oscar Garcia-Batte  have joined  the Saudi coalition forces in Yemen’s war against those supported by Iran. They are Riyadh’s mercenaries paid in the Abu Dhabi banks, and flanked by irregular Sudanese forces, mostly survivors  of  the Darfur war, in whose ranks there are very young fighters, not much older than teenagers.

Yemen’s war is one of the most recent examples, with the Syrian jihadist mercenaries hired from Turkey and sent to Libya, with a regular six-month contract, signed by the government of al-Sarraj - the UN backed GNA - for a monthly wage of around £ 1500. A salary 30 times higher than the paltry one received for  their employment in the Syrian conflict, with the promises - although later denied by Turkey - of a Turkish passport, free insurance and medical assistance of injured, and certain repatriation of those killed on the ground.

Briefly, in the new millennium wars, modern contractors operating alongside regular forces under the aegis of  international regulation - still shaky, but with at least defined and undersigned legal outlines, often supported by national legislation, and, in this regard, Italy is still lacking  -  more and more often   oppose the larger but above all anarchist environment of old style mercenaries.

Beyond the obvious ethical considerations - to which, however, only a small part of  Western world is sensitive – mercenaries represent an emergency for global security. Concerns about their unscrupulous behaviour,   their movements in  different war scenarios  (for example, the Russians of Wagner, from Ukraine, 2014, at the siege of Deir Ezzor in Syria, 2016-17, up to the Central African Republic in 2018, and now in Libya) or their engagement in repressing popular protests (as in Venezuela, with Russian mercenaries), and even their proven links with supranational organized crime.  Last but not least, it seems there is no control over their movements, as it happened – although it must  be verified -  with the escape of about 150 Syrian-Turkish jihadists from Libya, a dozen of whom would have attempted to reach the coasts of Italy and find refuge in Europe.

The risk is that, given the wide global instability, together with the power  ambitions of  many subjects,  and the weakness of regional and supranational political organizations to manage crises,  in modern and privatized wars,  the proven economic rule that bad money always, inevitably, drives out good money, will prevail. It is not a remote risk that is now looming with the use of old-fashioned mercenaries. The whole question requires attention, debate and discussion in order to overcome any hesitation, clear taboos that surround it and bring everything back, as far as possible, to a context of shared rules, whose application, above all, could be verified. Shared rules, once again,  make the difference between order and security in the face of anarchy and vulnerability for a country like Italy, exposed in the turbulent Mediterranean.

 

 

al-Bagdadi's death. A brief commentary

Al-Bagdadi’s killing by US special forces in the  Syrian compound of Barisha is feeding a great debate about  its effective realization, with concerns about  the future of  Isis and global jihadism.

Al-Bagdadi’s death has been declared by many, even too many times, to be actually fully credible. Scepticism  is therefore a personal feeling and, for this reason, a bad ally when it comes to making a good analysis.

It is necessary, in fact, to acknowledge that these are top secret situations, known only to the exclusive war cabinet and, for this reason, impossible to fact check.

It is only possible to take note of the news and to try to highlight the possible consequences.

The most important result is  the way  al-Bagdadi’s killing was carried out and subsequently presented  by  official announcements only has a value and exclusivety as a "narration", or "communication object". This applies to Trump’s people, who as a President  is now struggling with upcoming elections, the risk of impeachment, leadership crisis in the Middle East etc., as well as for al-Bagdadi’s people, who are  effectively without a leader but with the dream of Caliphate that has survived  the military defeat in Syria and Iraq, and  is now expanding beyond those borders.

For the jihadists, the violent death of a chief is equal to his martyrdom, and it is the reason for the   US’s insistence that al-Bagdadi’s last moments of life were as a "whining coward". The aim is to discredit him and annihilate his legend.

However, this narrative cannot stop the “Caliphate”  by itself, in the same way that   Bin Laden’s death definitively did not stop al-Qaeda.

The experience of the Islamic State, as we have seen in Syria and Iraq, surely can never  be repeated  again with those human, geographical and warfare characteristics. However, it can recur elsewhere, with other leaders, flags and ways of fighting. It will appear very probably where serious problems and domestic instability still remain. Al-Qaeda is an exhaustive example again.

Maybe, and hopefully, spectacular attacks will no longer occur in Western countries, but the legacy of the Islamic State and al-Bagdadi will remain in the form of a debate on the Muslim faith at risk of radicalization, which will give the rise to the criminalization of this religious practice. This fact could yet again recreate the perfect  conditions for the perpetuation of the jihadist threat on Western countries.

If we want to make the Barisha compound’s operation fully effective and the killing of  al-Bagdadi not such as an illusion, we know which path to take.

 

28/10/2019

Not only Islamic terrorism. New threats to domestic security

Islamic Terrorism is  commonly considered the greatest threat to  European security today. This is due to many factors, external and internal to the European Union or even the European regional area. In my opinion, this is the most famous but not the most dangerous threat facing Europe today. Islamic radicalization, and its call to the jihad,  is only one and a very particular threat, but other forces are now attempting to undermine the stability and security of all European countries, as well as those of other countries worldwide.

The success of jihadist terrorism to create panic and to impose  newer and newer security and defence measures is due to many elements. Firstly, there is great and wide propaganda on the web posted by Islamic Jihadist groups, mainly Isis, but  also al-Qaeda, that speaks about the main European capitals as future targets of their jihad or holy war. They incite their fighters, even the so called “lone wolves”, to act in their national countries against “infidels” in everyday life, wherever they are, and with every kind of instrument or weapon (such as knives, cars, trucks…). At the same time, their slogans speak of the conquest of Paris, Rome, the Vatican or Big Ben. These incitements are published on the Internet, on websites, even through periodical publications of jihadist reviews on line. They have an important role in the radicalization process of individuals much more familiar with navigation on the web- above all young  Muslims  even those outside Muslim  regions - who can take the challenge and try to act.

This fact has created global attention of analysts and journalists, as well as national security agencies. However, like flywheels, this information feeds the public fear.

Even if it is important to never underestimate every kind of threat,  however, this fear is easily utilized for different purposes  by political parties, especially nationalists or “sovreignists” ones in many  Western countries. In fact, Islamic Terrorism is often and erroneously associated with illicit immigration in Europe, mainly from North Africa and the Middle East.

Until now, only the terrorist attacks in Paris (2015) and Bruxelles (2016) have been carried out by people linked to Isis, and coming from  non-European regions. All the other bloody attacks have been carried out by European Muslim citizens or of second or even third generation immigrants. The problem is not immigration but the integration process that doesn’t work.

In my opinion, other subjects must now be considered as much more dangerous than jihadism for European as well as for all other Western countries’ domestic security. I refer to the far-right extremist groups or even white supremacist organizations. Even if they have not committed important terrorist attacks yet, and for this reason they are not considered “terrorists” by national and international law,  I consider them a new threat to the domestic and international security because of their subversive  arguments, their hate of “enemies” – such as Jews, black people and those have ways of life different to theirs - very similar to those of jihadist groups, and also for their links with other subversive groups around the world.

However, European terrorist lists don’t contain far-right groups, maybe because this domestic threat is more complex than the jihadist one -  due to social and economic failures common to all the Western world, and also because “far-right” is the common definition of some political parties that share the democratic participation in both European and American politics.

Nevertheless, their expressions of hate are very similar to an ideology: for this reason they could very soon become a global threat to the democratic system worldwide.

 

15/9/2019